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IS THERE A NEGATIVE JUDGMENT OF TASTE?
DISGUST AS THE REAL UGLINESS
IN KANT’S AESTHETICS
Can we find in Kant’s transcendental philosophy an aestheticjudgment on ugliness? What is its relationship with the principleof purposiveness? And what is the role of disgust? These ques-tions animated an intensive debate among Kantian scholars in thelast fifteen years. This article aims to contribute to such a debatefrom the standpoint of a theoretical position that considers the ug-ly in relation to aesthetic purposiveness and disgust. The justmentioned critical debate started with two articles, both pub-lished in the «British Journal of Aesthetics»: in 1998 David Shierclaimed that there are no pure negative aesthetic judgments inKant’s aesthetics1; in 1999 Christian Wenzel answered to Shier bystating that aesthetic disharmony exists and this proves the exis-tence of negative judgment of taste in Kantian aesthetics2. Thewhole debate is therefore based upon two opposite positionsabout the possibility of a judgment on ugliness in Kant’s philoso-phy. The claim I support derives from Shier’s position: I will try tointegrate it with the notion of purposiveness and with a compari-son with disgust.The arguments of the two parties are both very interestingand, almost in every case, involve the role of free play between theimagination and the understanding. Authors who state that therearen’t negative judgments also claim that the aesthetic judgmentis communicable and universally valid while the judgment on theugly cannot be communicable. What is communicable is the sub-ject’s state of mind constituted by the free play between the im-agination and the understanding, always in connection with plea-
1 D. Shier, Why Kant finds nothing ugly, «British Journal of Aesthetics» 38 (1998), 4, pp.412-418.2 C. Wenzel, Kant finds nothing ugly?, «British Journal of Aesthetics» 39 (1999), 2, pp.416-422.
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sure. Thus, if the negative aesthetic judgment existed, it would becommunicable; however, the free play, which grants the commu-nicability, is never connected with the displeasure that characte-rizes the ugly. Therefore negative aesthetic judgments don’t existin Kant’s transcendental philosophy3.Authors who claim that negative judgments of taste arepossible point instead to the necessity of an aesthetic disharmonyand recognize a link between such a disharmony and the know-ledge in general, as it happens for the free harmony between theimagination and the understanding. Wenzel, as well as the authorssupporting his position4, starts from Kant’s essay: Attempt to in-
troduce the concept of negative magnitudes into philosophy. Fol-lowing this essay, these authors claim that displeasure is not themere absence of pleasure, as ugliness is not the mere absence ofbeauty5. Through the principle of purposiveness is thus possibleto give a positive ground to ugliness, as well as to apply the struc-ture of the Analytic of the beauty to an Analytic of the ugly. Theseauthors support their claims also by grounding them on empiricalevidence. It is obvious, they say, that Kant had to consider judg-ments on ugliness, considering the fact that we undoubtedly haveexperience of it6.
3 This is, in sum, the argumentation of: D. Shier, R. Brandt (Die Schönheit der Kristallen
und das Spiel der Erkenntniskräfte. Zum Gegenstand und zur Logik des ästhetischen Urteils
bei Kant, in R. Brandt - W. Stark (eds.), Autographen, Dokumente und Berichte: Zu Edition,
Amtsgeschäften und Werk Immanuel Kants, Kant-Forschungen, 5, Hamburg, Felix MeinerVerlag, 1994, pp. 19-57), M. Rind (Can Kant’s deduction of judgments of taste be sa-
ved?, «Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie» 84 (2001), pp. 20-45), P. Guyer (Kant and
the purity of ugly, «Kant e-print» 3 (2004), 3, pp. 1-21).4 I refer to: C. Wenzel, H. Hudson (The significance of an analytic of the ugly in Kant’s de-
duction of pure judgments of taste, in R. Meerbote (ed.), North American Kant Society Stu-
dies in Philosophy: Kant’s aesthetics, Ridgeview, Atascadero, 1991, pp. 87-103), H. Allison(Kant’s theory of taste. A reading of the Critique of aesthetic judgments, Cambridge, Cam-bridge University Press, 2001, pp. 70 ss.), M. Steenhagen (Explainig the ugly: disharmony
and unrestrained cognition in Kant, «Estetica. Tijdschrift voor Kunst en Philosophie»,2010), S. McConnell (How Kant might explain ugliness, «British Journal of Aesthetics» 48(2008), 2, pp. 205-228).5 I. Kant, Versuch, den Begriff der negativen Größen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen, in
Kants Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. 2, hrsg. von der königlich Preußischen Akademie derWissenschaften, Berlin, Reimer, 1912, p. 194; Attempt to introduce the concept of negati-
ve magnitudes into philosophy, in Theoretical philosophy 1755-1770, trans. by D. Walford,Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 231.6 Other interesting essays, not totally reducible to any of these positions are: C. La Rocca,
Das Schöne und der Schatten. Dunkle Vorstellungen und ästhetische Erfahrung zwischen
Baumgarten und Kant, in H.F. Klemme - M. Pauen - M.-L. Raters (hrsg. v.), Im Schatten des
Schönen. Die Ästhetik des Häßlichen in historischen Ansätzen und aktuellen Debatten, Bie-lefeld, Aisthesis Verlag, 2006, pp. 19-64; C. La Rocca, L’intelletto oscuro. Inconscio e auto-
coscienza in Kant, in C. La Rocca (a cura di), Leggere Kant. Dimensioni della filosofia criti-
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1. Why negative judgments do not exist in Kant’s aestheticsIn my opinion, the more convincing argument on the role of ugli-ness in Kant’s aesthetic is that of Paul Guyer7, which in turn recallsthat of Reinhard Brandt8. Guyer agrees with Brandt in claimingthat certainly ugly things exist, but this does not mean that pureaesthetic judgment on the ugly exists as well. Guyer argues, in fact,that the experience of the ugly is impure and that Kant is thereforemore interested in showing the element of displeasure that cha-racterizes the sublime than that which defines the ugly. Guyer dis-cusses also the reference to negative magnitudes and recognizesthat displeasure is not a mere absence of pleasure. He also pointsout that in the Reflexionen, on the basis of the notion of pleasure,Kant defines three categories of aesthetics: the beauty, the ordi-nary and the ugly9. This triad might lead to the conclusion thatKantian aesthetics is grounded on the articulation of pleasure, ab-sence of pleasure and displeasure. Guyer however reminds usthat Kant’s aesthetics is grounded on the articulation of the facul-ties and that we can only have two kinds of relationship betweenthe imagination and the understanding: either the free play or thereference of the representation to an intellectual concept. If wehave a judgment, Guyer continues, there must be harmony be-tween the imagination and the understanding: we can recognizean object precisely because there is a unity, either logical or aes-thetic, between the imagination and the understanding. It followsthat there can be judgments on the ugly, but they are not pure aes-thetic judgments. Guyer concludes his argument with an interest-ing reference to disgust and displeasure connected with sub-
ca, Pisa, Edizioni ETS, 2007, pp. 63-116; D. Lohmar, Das Geschmacksurteil über das faszi-
nierend Hässliche, in H. Parret (ed.), Kants Ästhetik/Kant’s Aesthetics/L’esthétique de
Kant, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1996, pp. 498-512; D. Morgan, Kant trouble. The obscurities of
the enlightened, London - New York, Routledge, 2000; H. Parret, The ugly as the beyond of
the sublime, in C. Madelein - J. Pieters - B. Vandenabeele (eds.), Histories of the sublime,Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009; P. Giordanetti - M. Mazzocut-Mis, Storia
dell’estetica del brutto, Napoli, Scriptaweb, 2006; P. Giordanetti - G. Gori - M. Mazzocut-Mis, Il secolo dei lumi e l’oscuro, Milano, Mimesis, 2008; G. Thomson, Kant’s problems with
ugliness, «Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism» 50 (1992), 2, pp. 107-115.7 P. Guyer, op. cit.8 R. Brandt, Die Schönheit der Kristallen und das Spiel der Erkenntniskräfte cit.; see also R.Brandt, Zur Logik des ästhetischen Urteils, in H. Parrett (ed.), Kants Ästhetik/Kant’s Aes-
thetics/L’esthétique de Kant cit., pp. 229-245.9 R 669 (I. Kant, Reflexion, in Kants Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. 15, hrsg. von der königlichPreußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin-Leipzig, De Gruyter, 1925, pp. 196-197). See P. Guyer, op. cit., p. 3.
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lime10. I will get back to this reference in the second part of mycontribution.Guyer’s argumentation is criticized by Martin Steenhagen11,who recalls the interpretation of Henri Allison12. Allison arguesthat we should distinguish between harmony and free play.Steenhagen hence claims that the judgment on the ugly isgrounded on the disharmony of the faculties and that it has thesame subjective sources of the judgment on the beauty. On thisground he claims the possibility of a pure reflective aestheticjudgment on the ugly and the necessary overcoming of the epis-temological argument of Guyer. Guyer, he writes, seems to give forgranted that concepts are always at the core of experience, but apure reflective judgment requires abstraction from such a concep-tualism. Therefore Steenhagen suggests that the relationship be-tween the imagination and the understanding should be consi-dered as a necessary cooperation allowing us to conceive a judg-ment grounded on a disharmony. While it is impossible to define apure judgment in relation to disharmony, it is however possible torefer to a reflective judgment on the ugly, if we consider it as im-pure and not universally communicable.Steenhagen’s argument leads us to an important conclusion:there are impure aesthetic judgments on the ugly. Nevertheless,his argument does not answer Guyer’s article, which tries to an-swer the question whether or not there are pure aesthetic judg-ments on the ugly. The issue here is not whether or not we makeexperience of the ugly, which is undeniable, but whether there isroom in transcendental philosophy for a judgment on the ugly. Ibelieve that a convincing answer could be found by taking intoaccount the principle of purposiveness.In the First introduction to the critique of the power of judg-
ment, Kant defines purposiveness with relation to the need of thesubject to find some empirical rules in nature13. For this reasonKant can claim that purposiveness has a subjective character: theaesthetical judgment is grounded on the principle that nature isordered as if it was accordant to the subject’s faculties. The prin-
10 On the ugly and the sublime see: H. Parret, The ugly as the beyond of the sublime cit.11 M. Steenhagen, op. cit.12 H. Allison, op. cit.13 I. Kant, Erste Einleitung in die Kritik der Urteilskraft, in Kants Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.20, hrsg. von der Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1942,p. 213; First introduction to the critique of the power of judgment, in Critique of the power
of judgment, trans. by. P. Guyer, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, p. 17.
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ciple of purposiveness therefore ensures the relationship betweenthe imagination and the understanding and grants a free harmonybetween them. If we considered the ugly as a pure aestheticaljudgment, then we would have to refer it to the principle of pur-posiveness, the fundamental principle of the power of judgment.But how can ugly things be purposive for the subject?I think there are two solutions, mainly: either the fundamen-tal disharmony of the ugly is connected to an element of contra-purposiveness, or the displeasure created by the ugly is reducedto a form of pleasure. Kant certainly follows the second optionwhen he writes «beautiful art displays its excellence precisely bydescribing beautifully things that in nature would be ugly or dis-pleasing. The furies, diseases, devastations of war, and the likecan, as harmful things, be very beautifully described, indeed evenrepresented in painting»14. Although Kant recognizes a form ofcontra-purposiveness in the experience of the sublime and in hisdescription of the organisms15, he always brings it back to the sub-jective purposiveness. There is no room in Kantian aesthetics for areal contra-purposiveness and this clearly appears as the powerof judgment acts only by following the principle of purposiveness.Since we cannot account for any real contra-purposiveness, weare not allowed to claim any disharmony between faculties basedupon the principle of purposiveness. Finally, what can be judgedas ugly is brought back to beauty through the action of art. As inthe case of the sublime, the initial displeasure is led to a form ofpleasure.The argument of the contra-purposiveness is taken into con-sideration also by Hud Hudson and by Sean McConnell. In this re-gards, Hudson, who makes perhaps the first attempt to explain ug-liness in Kant’s aesthetics, writes that «it is this subjective contra-purposiveness in the presentation of the mere form of an object[…] that is connected with a universal disliking, and that promptsa judgment of taste (of reflection), when it is a judgment of ugli-ness […] ugly is an object’s form of contra-purposiveness insofar asit is perceived in the object without the presentation of a pur-
pose»16. McConnell stretches Hudson’s argument even further as
14 I. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, in Kants Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. 5, hrsg. von der kö-niglich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin, Reimer, 1913, p. 312; Critique
of the power of judgment cit., p. 190. From now quoted as KU.15 See KU, pp. 260 and 379; pp. 143 and 250.16 H. Hudson, op. cit., p. 93.
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he concludes: «in the case of a contra-final object, the empiricalimagination will never detect a rule and thus the object will notengage the cognitive faculties and so free play (or play for thatmatter) will never arise. […] An appeal to contra-purposiveness[…] destroys the very possibility of the judgment of taste»17.Both Hudson and McConnell try a different strategy to justifythe ugly in Kant’s aesthetics yet they do not come to a any drasticconclusion as I do: to my mind, there isn’t any pure aestheticaljudgment on the ugly. Either the ugly is reduced through art to aspecific form of beauty or it is excluded from the realm of thepower of judgment.
2. The real ugly: the case of disgustProperly speaking, the ugly is never excluded from Kant’s aesthet-ics, but it is rather reduced to the beauty. The «only one kind ofugliness – Kant writes – cannot be represented in a way adequateto nature without destroying all aesthetic satisfaction, hence beau-ty in art, namely, that which arouses loathing (Ekel)»18. It seemstherefore that the loathing can be considered as the real uglinessand as the real opposite of beauty.In the debate on the ugly, also Guyer takes into account thedisgusting and writes that disgust is an example of a not pure aes-thetic judgment on the ugly. Kant defines disgust as a sensationthat arises when «the object is represented as if it were imposingthe enjoyment which we are nevertheless forcibly resisting»19.Thus, Guyer claims that Kantian disgust is a moral answer to theattempt to make beauty what it is not and to overcome the free-dom of the imagination20. Similarly, Mojca Kuplen claims that dis-gust actually interferes with Kantian aesthetics, while the uglydoesn’t21. We can therefore argue that, although a purely negativeaesthetic judgment does not exist, the authentic negative judg-ment of taste and the real opposite of beauty seems to be the dis-gusting, and not the ugly. The ugly can in fact be reduced to the
17 S. McConnell, op. cit., pp. 216-217.18 KU, p. 312; p. 190. Here Kant seems almost literally quoting: G.E. Lessing, Laokoon:
Oder über die Grenzen der Malerei und Poesie, in Id.,Werke 1766-1769, hrsg. v. W. Barner,Frankfurt am Main, Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1990, vol. 5/2, pp. 9-206; Laocoön. An
essay on the limits of painting and poetry, ed. by E.A. McCormick, London, The JohnsHopkins University Press, 1984.19 KU, p. 312; p. 190.20 P. Guyer, op. cit., pp. 13-14.21 M. Kuplen, Disgust and ugliness. A Kantian perspective, in Contemporary aesthetics,2011.
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beauty so that it can find its own place in Kant’s aesthetics. Dis-gust expresses on the contrary the real threat to beauty.One of the very few significant studies on Kantian disgust iscertainly that of Winfried Menninghaus22. In his famous book onthe disgust, Menninghaus claims that Kant’s aesthetics follows adifferent trend from that of the 1750’s-1760’s debate animated byHerder and Lessing23. While Johan Adolf Schlegel and Moses Men-delssohn24 paid attention to the disgust only in some marginalpoints of their texts, Herder and Lessing gave great importance tothe disgust in their aesthetic theories. Kant, on the contrary, goesback to writing about the disgust only in his less prominent writ-ings: we find the most important passages on the disgust in the
Anthropology, in the Observations and in some unpublished texts.In his Beobachtungen Kant gives an interesting definition ofthe disgust. He writes that «nothing is so opposed to the beautifulas the disgusting»25. This statement seems to confirm my claimthat the real opposite of beauty is not the ugly, but the disgust. Inthis regard what Kant writes in his Remarks in the observations isalso very interesting: «beautiful and sublime are not the same. Thelatter swells the heart and makes the attention fixed and tense.Therefore, it exhausts. The former lets the soul melt in a soft sen-sation, and, in that it relaxes the nerves, it puts the feeling into agentler emotion, which, however, where it goes too far, trans-forms into weariness, surfeit and disgust»26. Reading this passage,
22 W. Menninghaus, Disgust. Theory and history of a strong sensation, transl. by H. Eiland -J. Golb, Suny, Albany 2003, pp. 103-120.23 G.E. Lessing, Laocoön cit.; J.G. Herder, Plastik. Einige Wahrnehmungen über Form und
Gestalt aus Pygmalions bildendem Träume, in Sämtliche Werke, vol. 8, hrsg. v. B. Suphan,Berlin, Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1892, pp. 1-87.24 M. Mendelssohn, 82. bis 84. Literaturbrief, in Gesammelte Schriften. Jubiläumsausgabe,vol. 5/1, Stuttgart, Frommann - Holzboog, 1991, pp. 130-137; J.A. Schlegel, Anmerkungen
über Ekel, in C. Batteux, Einschränkung der schönen Künste auf einen einzigen Grundsatz,
aus dem Französischen übersetzt und mit verschiednen eignen damit verwandten Abhand-
lungen begleitet von Johann Adolf Schlegeln, Leipzig, Weidmanns Erben und Reich, 1770,pp. 106-120.25 I. Kant, Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen, in Kants Gesam-
melte Schriften, Bd. 2, hrsg. von der königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaf-ten, Berlin, Reimer, 1912, p. 233; Observations on the feeling of the beautiful and the sub-
lime and other writings, trans. by P. Frierson - P. Guyer, Cambridge, Cambridge Universi-ty Press, 2011, p. 40. In the following page Kant adjuncts: «to distance oneself as far aspossible from this sort of disgustingness takes purity, which is indeed becoming forevery person, and which in the case of the fair sex is of the first rank among the virtuesand can hardly be taken too far by it» (I. Kant, Observations of the feeling of the beautiful
and sublime cit., p. 234; p. 41).26 Id., Bemerkungen zu den Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen, in
Kants Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. 20, hrsg. von der Preußischen Akademie der Wissen-
182 Serena Feloj
it seems therefore that Kant takes into account three aestheticcategories, that are not the beauty, the sublime and the ugly as inthe Reflexionen27, but rather the beauty, the sublime and the dis-gust28. Starting from this tripartition, Menninghaus states thatdisgust, thus defined, could be considered as an element of thetranscendental philosophy, constituing, just as beauty, an impor-tant strategic element of Kant’s system. Menninghaus is in factpersuaded that Kant places the origin of his aesthetics in the diffe-rentiation between the ideal sphere of the aesthetics and the rea-listic consideration of the disgust. On that basis, Menninghaus canclaim that Kant constructs a precise form of politics and morals ofthe disgust29.The major merit of Menninghaus’ analysis is namely the rec-ognition of the moral nature of Kantian disgust30. In the Pädago-
gik, Kant defines the disgust as the highest form of education31and in the Anthropology he writes:Even the presentation of the evil or ugly (for example, the figure of per-sonified death in Milton) can and must be beautiful whenever an objectis to be represented aesthetically, and this is true even if the object is a
Thersites. Otherwise the presentation produces either distaste or disgust,both of which include the endeavor to push away a representation that isoffered for enjoyment; whereas beauty on the other hand carries with itthe concept of an invitation to the most intimate union with the object,that is, to immediate enjoyment.32
schaften, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1942, p. 19; Remarks in the Observations on the feeling of the
beautiful and the sublime, in Observation on the feeling of beautiful and the sublime cit., p.79. See also: Id., Remarks cit., pp. 52 and 126; pp. 101 and 151.27 See the footnote n. 5.28 The same idea is expressed in: Id., Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze
der natürlichen Theologie und der Moral, in Kants Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. 20, hrsg. vonder Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1942, p. 280; Inquiry
concerning the distinctness of the principles of natural theology and morality, in Theoreti-
cal philosophy 1755-1770 cit., p. 252.29 W. Menninghaus, op. cit., pp. 103-104.30 His analysis is important also because he straights the relationship between disgustand ennui. It is possible to find elements that define this relationship in: I. Kant, Anthro-
pologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, in Kants Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. 7, hrsg. von derköniglich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin, Reimer, 1917, pp. 151 and276; Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view, in Anthropology, history and educa-
tion, trans. by R.B. Louden - G. Zöller, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp.265 and 371; Refl. 391 and 604 (Id., Reflexion cit., p. 259).31 Id., Pädagogik, in Kants Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. 9, hrsg. von der königlich Preußi-schen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin-Leipzig, De Gruyter, 1923, pp. 492-493.32 Id., Anthropology cit., pp. 241 and 345.
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Also in 1798 Kant maintains the definition of the disgust hehad given in the third Critique: the disgust is a feeling against animposing enjoyment. In the Anthropology the disgust is howeverconnected also to a «strong vital sensation», that Menninghauscan write that the disgust is part of the moral feeling and it makesmorality and freedom in feelings more real. In the Anthropology,Kant namely writes: «nausea, an impulse to free oneself of foodthrough the shortest way out of the esophagus (to vomit), hasbeen allotted to the human being as such a strong vital sensation,for this intimate taking in can be dangerous to the animal. Howev-er, there is also a mental pleasure […] and thus the natural instinctto be free of it is also called nausea by analogy, although it belongsto inner sense»33.The moral nature of the disgust is confirmed by Kant in apassage of the Metaphysics of morals, when he formulates the ideaof an aesthetics of morals:To think of several virtues (as one unavoidably does) is nothing otherthan to think of the various moral objects to which the will is led by theone principle of virtue, and so too with regard to the contrary vices. Theexpression that personifies both is an aesthetic device which still pointsto a moral sense. – So an aesthetics of morals, while not indeed part ofthe metaphysics of morals, is still a subjective presentation of it in whichthe feelings that accompany the constraining power of the moral law(e.g., disgust, horror, etc., which make moral aversion sensible) make itsefficacy felt, in order to get the better of merely sensible incitements.34This passage seems to confirm Menninghaus’s interpretation,which states that the disgust can be considered as a «negativesublime»: the disgust has a moral nature, it is connected to the vi-tal sensation and it cooperates in making morality real. Thus, itconstitutes a supplement to beauty35.
3. An interpretation of Kantian disgustAfter having claimed that the ugly can find a proper space inKant’s aesthetics only if it is reduced to beauty and that the realopposite of beauty, the one really excluded from Kantian aesthet-
33 Ibid., pp. 157-158 and 269.34 Id., Die Metaphysik der Sitten, in Kants Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. 6, hrsg. von der könig-lich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin, Reimer, 1914, p. 406; The meta-
physics of morals, in Practical philosophy, transl. by M.J. Gregor - A. Wood, Cambridge,Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 534.35 See W. Menninghaus, op. cit., p. 51.
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ics, is the disgust, we can go back to the initial questions. Can wefind in Kant’s transcendental philosophy an aesthetical judgmenton ugliness? What is its relationship with the principle of purpo-siveness? And what is the role of the disgust?I think, as I said before, that the solution may be provided bythe notion of purposiveness. The principle of purposiveness,which ensures the activity of the power of judgment, does notpermit any pure aesthetic judgment on the ugly. The contra-purposiveness is always reduced to the purposiveness, or else nopure reflective judgments would be possible. The contra-purposiveness that is irreducible to beauty (or to the sublime) isin fact totally excluded from Kant’s aesthetics through the feelingof the disgust. We can therefore claim that the disgust is the feel-ing that points at the real ugly and draws the bound that separateswhat has to be excluded from the transcendental philosophy. Thisidea is confirmed by the definition of the disgust that Kant gives inone of his Reflections: «the disgust is unpleasant for its own andunreserved. Therefore, our mind can’t be entertained through therepresentation of the disgust, as it is through that of the unhappi-ness. Sins against nature. We don’t speak gladly about them, be-cause they create from their own the representation of the dis-gust»36.The disgust can thus be defined as a strong vital sensationthat preserve the beauty and the purposiveness from the contra-purposiveness. The internal system of Kant’s third Critique isbased upon the reason’s need to recognize in nature some rulesthat allow the transition from the determination of nature to themoral freedom. The purposiveness that we find in nature has thena subjective nature and the objective ugliness of our experienceshasn’t got any chance to find a place in Kant’s system, that is to sayit cannot play any role in the realization of the transition from na-ture to freedom. On the contrary, disgust can play a significantrole in the transcendental philosophy. Although Kant doesn’t giveit much room in his critical writings, disgust has a moral natureand defines the limits of what can be accepted in Kant’s aesthetics.Paradoxically37, the disgusting arises in front of those things thatforcibly impose an enjoyment to the subject. It likely refers to
36 R 502 (I. Kant, Reflexion cit., p. 218); some reference to disgust can be found also inother anthropological Reflexionen: 275, 286, 366, 1067 (Id., Reflexion cit., p. 104, 107,143, 473).37 But perfectly coherent with the definition of disgust given in the 18th century.
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those things that are so ugly that can’t be reduce to beauty andrest in the realm of the contra-purposiveness. The notion of pur-posiveness can thus explain the role of disgust as an aestheticalcategory that defines the bounds of aesthetics. The relationshipbetween the disgusting and the ugly may help us explain the con-ceptual boundary between purposiveness and counter-purposive-ness, even though we are still missing a clear criterion for distin-guish between irredeemably ugly and ugly qua reduced to beautythrough art, and, in fact, for separating the ugly from the disgust-ing in the first place.Differently from the ugly, the disgusting has a simpler struc-ture, as it doesn’t request an articulation of the imagination and ofthe understanding nor it asks to be considered as the object of ajudgment. It is just an immediate and really strong feeling, thatmoves the subject in the direction of the judgment of taste andnullifies the threat of contra-purposiveness. Disgust, as Menning-haus states, can thus be compared to the moral feeling for its func-tion of delineating the boundary of a judgment, that is, in this case,the pure reflective aesthetic judgment.
